

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		25 March 1981
TO: TO ADCI		
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<p>REMARKS: FYI State asked us to do a "Red Team" briefing book for the Shultz meeting with Shevardnadze in April. Our response is attached. It was prepared by SOVA and coordinated with Larry and Doug. As the cover note says, I wanted it to be deliberately provocative highlighting things that the Soviets might propose that could put us off balance.</p> <p><i>Bob - want to show this to Weinberger, Carlucci & N. They also might find it useful.</i></p>		
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24 March 1987

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: 13-16 April Moscow Meeting: Shevardnadze's Approach

Enclosed is a mock Soviet briefing book such as might be prepared for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It was prepared by CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis to provide Secretary Shultz with some ideas about possible Soviet initiatives or reactions during his visit to Moscow. It emphasizes arms control issues because they are likely to be a focal point of Shevardnadze's efforts. While informed by the current discussions in Geneva and hints from diplomatic conversations and controlled sources, this book is a deliberately speculative effort, not just a "best estimate" of one approach, and it emphasizes a variety of ideas Shevardnadze might propose to put us in a defensive position. Possible new Soviet positions on arms control issues are underlined. (S NF)

Robert E. Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for the USSR

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BRIEFING BOOK

For

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

Meeting with US Secretary of State Shultz, April 13-16, 1987

CIA/SOVA/24 Mar 87

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Objectives

To gain Shultz's agreement to a joint statement that an INF treaty is within our grasp and that the two sides are planning for a summit in Washington this fall to sign it.

- To this end, his agreement should be sought for joint instructions to both sides' Geneva negotiators on issues such as short-range missiles and verification, which so far have held up progress.

- Other areas of probable bilateral arms control agreements should also be defined, e.g. nuclear risk reduction centers.

To push the pace of discussion on strategic offensive and defensive arms.

- We will not re-link INF to these issues, but we will seek to carry over momentum achieved in INF to the other areas.

- This meeting therefore is to be a stepping-stone to anticipated future progress and not at all like the sterile November meeting in Vienna.

To keep the focus on arms control and on possibilities for progress.

- While giving Shultz time to make his obligatory comments on "human rights" and regional issues during the first overview session, we want to maximize time for arms control issues.

- To this end, propose that working groups be formed to discuss, or in some cases to resolve, issues in these areas that the two sides want to pursue.

- Propose that the two principals, supported by necessary staff, work toward narrowing the gaps that remain on INF and exploring new thinking on strategic and space arms.

To engage Shultz in negotiations and stress possibilities for success.

- He, and this meeting, may be useful for short-circuiting the decisionmaking process in Washington, which is dominated by anti-Soviet hardliners.

- It should emerge from this meeting to all outsiders, particularly West European elites and publics, that the USSR once again has taken the initiative to advance the prospects of reaching a major arms control agreement.

- The US must come out of the meeting looking like the obstacle if no progress is achieved.

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Medium-Range Missiles

A US-Soviet agreement on this subject is the Soviet leadership's highest near-term arms control priority.

- Seek political agreement on this as a joint US-Soviet goal.

Explore the key remaining issues of operational-tactical missiles (the US side calls them "SRINF") and verification. Let Shultz address these issues first and state that the Soviet side has the requisite political will to resolve them.

On SRINF, begin by stressing our position that the US should not build up its forces and that reduction and elimination of these systems should be the subject of immediate and separate talks.

- You are authorized to discuss concurrent constraints on SRINF and hint at possible new Soviet initiatives aimed at resolving the SRINF issue providing there is no conversion of Pershing IIs to Pershing Is or of GLCMs to SLCMs.
- If this elicits no response, say we are prepared to reduce and eliminate all missiles of 500-1,000 km range globally in five years--including our "SS-12" and "SS-23" missiles.
- Finally, you may say we are willing to enter into immediate negotiations to reduce and eliminate operational-tactical missiles with ranges less than 500 km.

On verification, state that we are as concerned about this issue as the US side and that the US and the five NATO-basing countries should be prepared to allow the USSR the same type of intrusive inspection measures as the US side is seeking on Soviet territory.

- Do not discuss specific verification measures in detail.
- Press Shultz as hard on this issue as he presses you. If he takes 20 minutes on it, do likewise.
- If you judge it expedient, indicate that we will permit inspection of the destruction of the 27 missiles and launchers removed from combat alert in Europe in 1985 as well as the 243 stationed there today.

If Shultz appears to be stalling or uninterested, you may say that the USSR is prepared to reduce and eliminate all medium-range missiles globally in five years, not just those in Europe, if the US freezes deployment of all forward-based systems in the Pacific region.

- A total ban should lead to eased US requirements on verification, e.g. there would be no fear of moving Asian SS-20s to Europe and no ongoing production of SS-20s to monitor.

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Space Arms

Begin by stressing that deep reductions in strategic arms are impossible without an agreement on space arms.

Ascertain if the US side is still arguing for the "broad" interpretation of the ARM Treaty.

- Probe Shultz on when Reagan will make his final decision on this interpretation and whether a compromise with Congress on this issue and SDI funding is in the works.
- Point out that US evisceration of the ARM Treaty through the formal adoption of the broad interpretation would cause the Soviet side to reassess the merit of continuing negotiations on strategic arms and, possibly, of continuing the push for an INF treaty.

Explain that the USSR is willing simply to live with the current ARM Treaty, possibly without any agreed period of nonwithdrawal, provided that we can agree on the basic limitations it contains regarding space-based ARM systems.

- You should state that testing in space of ARM systems is inadmissible, a "bottom line" for the USSR.
- You are authorized to tell Shultz in a one-on-one setting that Gorbachev realizes the approach he took at Reykjavik--only work in tabs should be permitted--was not an effective way of presenting the Soviet position. Point out, however, that there must be some mutually acceptable line drawn between permitted and prohibited SDI activities.

You are also authorized to probe further for any US interest in devising new measures to limit testing in space.

- Specifically, you should determine whether the US side would be willing to discuss in Geneva limits on power levels or brightness thresholds of lasers and on dimensions of mirrors.
- You also should probe for any US interest in negotiating a dividing line between activities in space that would be permitted, such as sensor research, and activities that would be prohibited, such as the testing of "kill vehicles." Make clear that agreement on such a line is of critical importance for the USSR.

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Strategic Offensive Arms

The US response on space arms will determine the flexibility you have in discussing strategic offensive arms questions.

- If the US response is totally negative, keep your remarks terse on strategic offensive arms.
- Remind the US side once again that further movement on strategic offensive arms will depend on developments in the space arms negotiations.

If the US side shows some interest in Soviet space arms proposals, you are authorized to state that US concerns on sublimits and throw-weight could be satisfactorily resolved.

- You can also state that we are willing to fully air the mobile ICRM issue with the United States in Geneva and to discuss detailed verification measures to alleviate US concern over such systems.
- Remind the US side, however, that such a thorough discussion must also take place on sea-launched cruise missiles. Tell Shultz that the ball is in the US court on this issue now that we have made our SLCM proposal and that an agreement on SLCMs is a prerequisite for an overall agreement on strategic offensive arms.

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Nuclear Testing

Express our disappointment that the US side is not seriously engaging in full-fledged negotiations on an eventual comprehensive test ban.

- Ascertain if Shultz has brought any new ideas on achieving agreement on lower testing thresholds or annual test quotas. If he has not, tell him we are ready to agree to such ideas in a step-by-step approach as the sides reduce their nuclear arsenals.
- You are authorized to state that we will consider strengthening the verification provisions of the 1974 and 1976 testing treaties if the US side will commit itself either to formal negotiations leading to a test ban or to interim agreements on lower testing thresholds and annual test quotas.
- On verification, tell him that our seismic techniques are more promising than the US CORRTX system.
- Such negotiations could lead to the conclusion of interim agreements on lower testing thresholds and annual test quotas.

If Shultz raises the venting issue concerning our recent nuclear tests, tell him that there was no venting beyond our national borders and that the US should produce any evidence to support its claim.

State that an agreement on nuclear testing could be accomplished in time for a summit later this year.

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Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

State that another negotiating round should be held as soon as possible to reconcile the draft agreements of both sides.

- Assert that an agreement should be concluded over the next few months and included on the agenda for a summit later this year.

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Chemical Weapons

You are instructed to state that we seek a global ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible.

- Remind the US side how responsive we have been on verification at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
- State that we are willing to accelerate bilateral discussions with the US delegation at the CD.
- Express willingness to accept formally UK proposal for challenge on-site inspection of declared facilities.
- State that a CW agreement could be an important part of the agenda for a summit.

Determine how serious Washington is for an agreement as opposed to stalling the talks so that its binary weapons program can be implemented.

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Conventional Force Reductions

You should begin by stressing the Warsaw Pact appeal in Budapest last year for major force reductions.

- Tell Shultz that the NATO declaration in Brussels last December did not address such reductions.
- Express disappointment that at the Vienna meetings so far the West still is not talking about reductions and that we are still waiting for a substantive response to our proposal.

State bluntly to Shultz that the MRFR talks are a failure and should be ended. Tell him that NATO bears responsibility for this because of its lack of seriousness about reductions and its demands for verification out of proportion to the scope of the proposed reductions.

- Point out that Western talk about Warsaw Pact superiority is inaccurate and counterproductive. Remind Shultz that he himself asserted in a speech last year that there exists approximate parity between the two blocs.
- Urge the US side to respond to our proposal so that new impetus can be given to conventional arms control.

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Bilateral Relations

State that the Soviet leadership is willing to conclude a new space cooperation agreement as soon as possible, perhaps at a summit this year.

Probe for any US interest in renewing the 1974 energy agreement.

Determine what the US position is on revitalizing the US-USSR Agreement for Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology and the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation.

Tell Shultz that there is mutual benefit in expanding the forms of cooperation under the existing bilateral agreements.

- You should express our interest in increasing the number of visits by individual scientists under the Interacademy Exchange Agreement between the US National Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences.
- Shultz may respond with a request that Moscow provide American scientists easier access to Soviet facilities, data bases, and geographical areas.

Seek US concurrence under the agricultural agreement for Soviet scientists to conduct research in the United States for an extended period of time, perhaps up to a year.

- Voice our concern that cooperation under the agricultural agreement not be linked to the Long Term Agreement on grain.
- Express our interest in expanding cooperation under the agriculture agreement in the areas of biotechnology, machine technology, and computer technology.

State our willingness to pursue under the bilateral agreement on atomic energy productive exchanges on nuclear plant safety and our interest in formalizing scientific and information exchanges on breeder reactors.

Convey our interest in initiating formal collaboration under the US-USSR Agreement for Cooperation in Environmental Protection on the nuclear winter issue and environmental protection of the high seas.

In discussing our diplomatic and consular mission in the United States, inform Shultz of our dissatisfaction concerning the restrictive measures taken by the State Department.

- We would like a higher ceiling for our temporary personnel and relaxed travel restrictions for our embassy officials.

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Regional Issues

Listen to any US presentations on these issues and be attentive to any changes in position.

- Respond to any US claims that the USSR is obstructing progress on regional conflicts by outlining the wide range of Soviet proposals on Asian security, the Middle East peace process, the Gulf War, and the importance of regional settlements in a system of genuine international security.

Remind the US side that we have shown substantial flexibility on the Afghanistan situation over the past several months, flexibility that now must be matched by meaningful concessions from the other side.

- If the US presses further on Afghanistan, emphasize that our desire to withdraw is sincere but that this cannot be at the price of shunting aside the present regime.
- Insist that the regime is willing to share power with exile and resistance elements that will negotiate with it and hold out the prospect that Najib need not be in power at the end of the negotiating process.
- Say that we have encouraged that regime to accept compromise and that now the US and Pakistan must do the same with the resistance.
- We are not, however, willing to leave with our tail between our legs or to see our clients take a bloodbath.
- If the US raises the question of cross-border attacks on Pakistani territory, accuse the US of escalating tensions in the region by introducing Stinger missiles, and point out that the USSR and DRA naturally will defend themselves against this new provocative action.

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"Human Rights"

Listen to any US presentation on this issue and agree to take any US lists of specific cases.

- Do not negotiate from these US lists. Simply state that we will look into these cases.

Remind Shultz of the significant moves we have made in this area over the past year and tell him that we fully intend to continue such a policy for our own domestic reasons, not to please the West.

- Tell him that there will be a large increase this year in Soviet Jewish emigration.

If he becomes long-winded on "human rights," cut off the discussion, deny that the US has any grounds to lecture us, and move to other topics.

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Summit

Could be held in Washington in late summer or the fall if an agreement on medium-range missiles can be reached and progress made on other arms control issues.

- Specific date could be worked out at next ministerial meeting in June or July.

Agenda for a summit could include:

- Conclusion of agreements on chemical weapons, nuclear testing, and nuclear risk reduction centers.
- Further progress toward a framework agreement on space and strategic arms.
- Various agreements in bilateral programs, including outer space, energy, technology, and scientific exchanges.

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